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Abstract 
The concept of consent is fundamental in considering the crime of rape under the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA). Consent was placed on a statutory footing for the 
first time by the SOA which defines consent alongside evidential and conclusive 
presumptions under sections 74-76, respectively. This article explores the position 
that unfortunately, neither significant clarity nor enhanced protection appears to have 
been embraced or achieved by the incorporation of consent. 
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Introduction 
This article examines the issue of consent in the context of sexual offences law, 
specifically the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA) which has now been in force for 
over six years. This choice was inspired by the controversial and sensitive nature of 
the issues and provisions encompassed by the SOA alongside the lack of academic 
consensus and current guidance. The law on consent prior to the SOA was governed 
by case law but was deemed unsatisfactory by the Home Office in 1999. This 
resulted in the report Setting the Boundaries1 which has been largely well received in 
terms of its research, consultation process and comprehensive recommendations. 
The predominant and most widely accepted proposal of Setting the Boundaries was 
to introduce a statutory definition of consent, a clear rejection of the previous 
                                                 
1
 Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sex Offences vol.1 (2000, 
Home Office). 
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Olugboja 19812 approach. The proposals were based upon a number of principles 
previously established in case law. Consent is an essential element in determining 
whether a defendant is guilty of a sexual offence. It is therefore fundamental that it is 
defined meticulously to enable the judiciary to interpret the law correctly and in turn 
provide adequate direction to juries. 
 
The consent provisions are contained within sections 74-76 SOA. This article will 
consider some primary issues that consent entails namely, HIV disclosure, 
intoxication and consent provided by individuals with mental disorders. The adequacy 
of the sections dealing with these issues will be analysed.  
 
Overall, sections 74-76 have consolidated much of the earlier law, giving the précis 
that clarification has been found and the aims of Setting the Boundaries, achieved. 
However, on further analysis it appears that since its enactment this statutory 
definition has not delivered the desired clarity expected.  A primary example of this 
can be seen within section 74 which provides the general definition of consent: „a 
person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make 
that choice.‟ Temkin and Ashworth state that this provision „positively sprouts 
uncertainties.‟3 Card et al acknowledge that the terms freedom, choice and 
agreement are „complex and ambiguous concepts, which defy precise definition.‟4 
Thus the previous problems of interpretation and clarity are therefore by no means 
resolved by section 74. 
 
1 HIV Disclosure, Consent and Rape 
Currently, liability for HIV transmission through sexual intercourse arises under the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA). The complexities of the issue of 
consent to sexual intercourse mean that potentially a case can be made out for rape 
to be a preferred charge. This is a highly contentious subject and one that many 
academics, particularly Herring, consider the law to have taken an unsatisfactory and 
restrictive approach so far.  
 
                                                 
2
 R v Olugboja [1981] 3 All ER 443. 
3
 Temkin, J., and Ashworth, A., „The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) Rape, sexual assaults 
and the problems of consent‟, (2004) Criminal Law Review at p.339. 
4
 Ibid. 
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R v Dica [2004],5 the primary authority in this area, confirmed that section 20 OAPA, 
inflicting grievous bodily harm, is „the most appropriate ground for convicting a 
reckless transmission of the HIV virus through sexual intercourse.‟6 While the Court 
of Appeal discussed issues regarding fraud and consent, Lord (now Chief) Justice 
Judge stated that consent to sexual intercourse gained fraudulently remained valid 
for the purposes of rape. The women consented to the act of sexual intercourse and 
consent could not be subsequently retracted, the general rule is that it remains a 
consensual act.  
 
GBH requires a harm element. To be satisfied, all the layers of the skin must be 
broken. In R v Chan-Fook, Hobhouse LJ held that an infection resulting from an 
assault was an internal injury sufficient to meet this requirement.7 Section 20 is 
therefore an appropriate offence to charge in some instances, for example, where the 
HIV status was intentionally withheld from the complainant or they were deceived or 
mistaken about it. In such situations it is suggested that the offence should more 
suitably constitute rape. An alternative prosecution route is section 18, wounding with 
intent to cause GBH. It is conceivable that a defendant aware that he is carrying the 
disease transmits it intentionally. This intention would have to be proven by satisfying 
the Woolin [1998]8 test of intent; meaning transmission of the disease through sexual 
intercourse would have to be considered virtually certain. 
 
Herring argues that „Agreement obtained by deception is woefully insufficient. 
Informed and free consent, at least, is required.‟9 To a certain extent this position has 
been entrenched in R v Konzani [2005]10 where the Court of Appeal extended Dica, 
holding that for consent to be present and valid it must have been an informed 
consent. Konzani was convicted of section 20 GBH for inflicting HIV upon three 
women after having unprotected sexual intercourse with them. The Court recognised 
the principle of sexual autonomy, in accordance with the SOA. Judge LCJ stated that 
concealment of HIV status by a defendant: 
 
                                                 
5
 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103. 
6
 Ramage, S., „The criminal offence of causing infection of HIV virus‟, (2008) 187, Criminal 
Lawyer p.2. 
7
 Ramage, „Causing infection of HIV virus,‟ p.4. 
8
 R v Woolin [1998] 4 All ER 103. 
9
 Herring, J., „Human rights and rape: a reply to Hyman Gross‟, (2007) Criminal Law Review 
p.229. 
10
 R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706. 
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…almost inevitably means [the complainant] is deceived. Her consent is not 
properly informed, and she cannot give an informed consent to something of 
which she is ignorant… Silence in these circumstances is incongruous with 
honesty, or with a genuine belief that there is an informed consent.11 
 
This suggests that a complainant unaware of a defendant‟s HIV status cannot 
provide informed consent, nor can the defendant reasonably believe in their consent. 
Accordingly, a defendant placing himself in such a situation should be liable for rape. 
Section 74 of the SOA states that a person provides consent if they agree by choice 
and have the freedom and capacity to make that choice. It has been argued that HIV 
status, in particular deception of it, can affect this choice.  As Leigh states: 
 
It is difficult to see how a person can be said to agree by choice when a matter 
relevant to choice (as will certainly be the case where the victim has raised the 
issue of HIV status) is misrepresented to her.12  
 
This provides further authority that any misrepresentation of HIV status should affect 
the requisite consent of a complainant. 
 
Evidently, there are valid arguments for complainants to make a plausible claim for 
rape where a defendant fails to disclose his HIV positive status. Unfortunately, the 
case law does not support this as R v B [2006]13 made clear. With regard to section 
74, Latham LJ in the Court of Appeal stated: 
 
…as a matter of law, the fact that the appellant may not have disclosed his HIV 
status is not a matter which could in any way be relevant to the issue of consent 
under Section 74 in relation to the sexual activity in this case.14 
 
The Court also held that consent to sexual intercourse is not vitiated by ignorance of 
the defendant's HIV status. The case makes it clear that failure by a defendant to 
disclose the fact that he has a sexually transmissible disease is irrelevant to the issue 
of consent under section 74. Elvin acknowledges that despite the clarification the 
case provided, it is a „contentious decision and it does not provide comprehensive 
guidance about which mistakes vitiate consent.‟15 
 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., at para 4. 
12
 Leigh, L., „Two cases on consent in rape,‟ p.7.  
13
 R v B [2006] EWCA Crim 2945. 
14
 Ibid., at para 21. 
15
 Elvin, J., „The Concept of Consent under the Sexual Offences Act 2003,‟ (2008) 72 Journal 
of Criminal Law p.519. 
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There are various arguments suggesting that HIV transmission should alter consent 
under section 76(2)(a), by reason that the complainant is deceived and/or the nature 
or purpose of the act is altered or unknown to the complainant. Deception is a 
common issue in HIV cases, but section 76 only provides for deception as to the 
nature or purpose of the act. It can be suggested that sexual intercourse with a HIV 
positive defendant changes the nature of the act from a safe one to a contrastingly 
dangerous and potentially life threatening one. Leigh considers that such deception 
as to HIV status „goes to the nature of the sexual act, changing it from an act that has 
certain natural consequences (whether pleasure, pain or pregnancy), to a potential 
sentence of disease or death.‟16 
  
This indicates that deceptive HIV transmission vitiates consent and that the preferred 
offence should be rape. Despite this, Miles recognises in reference to R v B that: 
 
Although the court did not explore the issue expressly in these terms, it may 
be said that a mistake regarding the HIV status is not one that goes to the 
“nature or purpose” of the act…for the purposes of s.76.17  
 
Loveless favours the approach taken in the Canadian case R v Cuerrier [1998],18 
which held that deception regarding health went to the very nature of the act and 
vitiated consent. Loveless states: „it should be rape,‟19 and proposes that a more 
thorough evaluation of consent is required in order to give effective meaning to 
sexual autonomy; the underlying principle of the SOA. 
 
Deception as to impersonation of another is governed by section 76(2)(b). This 
deception is comparable to one regarding HIV status as both are carried out with the 
intention to induce the complainant to engage in sexual intercourse. In both instances 
the defendants are aware that if it was not for their deception, the complainant would 
not have consented. As Temkin asserts:  
 
A person who expressly lies about HIV status deliberately places the life of 
the deceived party at risk. Neither fraud by impersonation nor fraud as to the 
nature or purpose of the act can compare in terms of the potential 
seriousness of the outcome.20 
                                                 
16
 Leigh, L., „Two cases on consent in rape,‟ p.9. 
17
 R v B  at 21. 
18
 R v Cuerrier [1998] 127 CCC (3d) 1. 
19
 Loveless, J., Criminal Law, Text, Cases and Materials (2008: Oxford University Press) 
p.529. 
20
 Temkin, J., Rape and the Legal Process (2002: Oxford University Press) p.106. 
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This statement questions why impersonation of another is included in the SOA and 
amounts to rape whereas the more dangerous circumstance of transmitting HIV does 
not. The judicial view does not reflect the preferred position of academics, and rarely 
have deceptions other than those specifically stated in the SOA been held to alter 
consent. 
 
One exception in respect of a deception to change the nature or purpose of a sexual 
act is R v Tabassam [2000].21 This case did not involve HIV transmission but is 
informative in respect of deception and consent. The defendant deceptively gained 
consent to touch the breasts of three women by telling them that the touching was 
being done for medical purposes. He was convicted of indecent assault. The Court of 
Appeal held that the women „were consenting to the nature of the act but not its 
quality‟; therefore there was no consent for the purposes of sexual offences. Selfe 
notes that the reference in section 76 to nature and purpose is not qualitatively 
different to the common law nature or quality test22. 
 
R v Jheeta [2007]23 involved a defendant embarking upon what the Court of Appeal 
described as a „bizarre and fictitious fantasy‟24 of deception which pressurised the 
complainant into having sexual intercourse with him more frequently than she would 
have otherwise. The focus of the court was upon the deception and whether it 
vitiated consent. It was held that certain deceptions are capable of vitiating consent 
but these deceptions were narrowly construed. Emphasis was placed upon the 
phrase „nature and purpose of the relevant act‟ under section 76, which in the context 
of rape is sexual intercourse. The Court of Appeal thought that the only deception in 
this case was the fictitious situation that was created to secure the complainant‟s 
frequent participation in sexual intercourse. There was no deception as to the nature 
or purpose of the act. The case law clearly illustrates that if the nature or purpose of 
sexual intercourse is not directly altered as a result of deception, no liability for rape 
will attach to a defendant.  
 
Nor does the law support rape claims on the basis of a silent mistake, despite 
persuasive arguments to the contrary. Herring believes that such mistakes can 
                                                 
21
 R v Tabassum (2000) 2 Cr App R 328. 
22
 Selfe, D., „The meaning of consent within the Sexual Offences Act 2003‟, (2008) 178 
Criminal Lawyer p.4. 
23
 R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699. 
24
 Ibid., at 28. 
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undermine consent, and more specifically that there is no valid consent: „if at the time 
of the sexual activity a person: i) is mistaken as to a fact; and ii) had s/he known the 
truth about that fact would not have consented to it.‟25 In analysing HIV transmission 
in this context, once more it appears there is no valid consent. Where a  complainant 
may be mistaken in believing the defendant to be free of the sexually transmittable 
disease it can be presumed that if they thought otherwise they would not have 
consented. Herring argues that his suggestion enhances sexual autonomy and gives 
„due respect to the parties‟ understanding of what the act means.‟26 A contrasting 
approach is voiced by Hyman Gross who states that the criminal law is not in place to 
protect people „against the disappointments and humiliations of their bad judgment, 
their gullibility, or their too trusting nature‟27 and therefore believes that strict limits 
should be placed on what mistakes vitiate consent. The Hyman Gross view is 
reflected in the SOA and judicial reasoning that mistakes as to HIV status do not give 
rise to a rape claim. 
 
Non-disclosure of HIV does not negate consent at law as firmly decided in R v B. The 
Court of Appeal stated:  
 
Where one party to sexual activity has a sexually transmissible disease 
which is not disclosed to the other party any consent that may have been 
given to that activity by the other party is not thereby vitiated. The act 
remains a consensual act.28 
 
Miles believes the law has taken a step backwards with the removal of section 3 of 
the Sexual Offences Act 1956: procuring a woman by false pretences, as deceptions 
about HIV status would have more chance of fulfilling this criterion.29 Ramage 
provides justification for the strictness of the consent rules stating that „People take 
risks all the time in this modern age and to criminalise the consensual taking of risks 
is unrealistic in terms of enforcement.‟30 This is a logical justification but the position 
of the law currently opposes the arguments of the majority of academics who still 
consider the laws on this matter to be controversial and unsatisfactory.  
 
2 Intoxication and Capacity to Consent 
                                                 
25
 Herring, J., „Mistaken Sex‟ (2005) Criminal Law Review 511 at p.517. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Gross, H., 'Rape, Moralism, and Human Rights' [2007] Criminal Law Review 224–5.  
28
 R v B at 17. 
29
 Miles, J., „Sexual offences: consent, capacity and children‟, (2008) 10, Archbold News p.7. 
30
 Ibid.,p.3. 
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Intoxication has also proven to be a significant issue in the context of consent. This is 
reflected by statistics acknowledging that a substantial 35% of rape complaints have 
been evidenced to be alcohol related.31 Section 75(2)(f) provides protection for those 
complainants who have been intoxicated against their will and subsequently engaged 
in presumably non-consensual intercourse. This protection is limited in comparison to 
the proposed provision by the Government in Setting the Boundaries32 that 
anticipated the inclusion of a circumstance where a complainant was too affected by 
alcohol or drugs to give free agreement.33 This was not adopted by the following 
consultation paper, Protecting the Public,34 prompting Temkin and Ashworth to 
recognise that section 75(2)(f) is „considerably narrower since it relates only to 
situations where [the complainant‟s] intoxication is patently blameless‟35 i.e. where a 
complainant had a substance administered to them or caused to be taken by them. 
Temkin and Ashworth also consider that the concept of contributory negligence 
influenced the Government‟s thinking since it seems that voluntarily intoxicated 
complainants are placed in a different moral category from complainants who have 
alcohol or drugs surreptitiously administered to them.36 This accommodates the 
explanation provided by the then Home Secretary: 
 
I have rejected the suggestion that someone who is inebriated could claim that 
they were unable to give consent…on the ground that we do not want 
mischievous accusations.37 
Not only is the provision limited in its disregard for voluntary intoxication, it incurs 
further concerns and ambiguity. For instance, Tadros states: „Notice the lengths 
that this provision goes to contort itself to make an evidential provision out of 
something that ought to be constitutive of the offence.‟38 
This highlights that there is neither adequate explanation nor logic for why the 
administration of stupefying substances constitutes a rebuttable presumption and 
not an irrebuttable presumption. A further issue is that stupefaction is not defined 
                                                 
31
 Fears over alcohol link to rape, BBC News, 21 December 2005. 
32
 Home Office, Setting the Boundaries vol.1.  
33
 Ibid., para.2.10.9. 
34
 Home Office, Protecting the Public: Strengthening protection against sex offenders and 
reforming the law on sexual offences (2002: Home Office). 
35
 Temkin and Ashworth, „The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) Rape, sexual assaults and the 
problem of consent‟, p.339. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Finch, E., and Munro, V., „Intoxicated consent and the boundaries of drug assisted rape‟, 
(2003) Criminal Law Review citing the Home Secretary at p.785. 
38
 Tadros, V., „Rape without consent‟, (2006) 26(3), Oxford Journal of Legal Studies p.528. 
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within the SOA. Given that the provision was aimed primarily at date rape drugs, 
which often do not have the effect of unconsciousness, it can be assumed that the 
provision covers situations where the complainant retains consciousness. This 
implies acceptance that the ability to consent can depreciate or completely 
disappear before a complainant reaches unconsciousness. It is therefore 
questionable why voluntarily intoxicated complainants are not protected unless 
they are rendered unconscious. Tadros suspects also that the level of intoxication 
to satisfy section 75(2)(f) is „problematically high‟39 placing further doubt upon the 
level of protection offered.  
 
In summarising the provision, Temkin and Ashworth acknowledge that: 
 
The many women who get raped when they are drunk and whose inebriation is 
more or less voluntary will have to take their chances in the legal process 
without the benefit of evidential presumptions.40 
 
Evidently, a complainant failing to meet the restrictive requirements of section 
75(2)(f) is left with protection only under the general definition of section 74 unless 
they are so intoxicated as to render themselves unconscious under section 75(2)(d). 
This section presumes that consent is absent where the complainant was asleep or 
unconscious. The circumstances leading to the unconsciousness are irrelevant, 
meaning voluntarily intoxicated complainants are protected. This seems a 
controversial approach given the intentional exclusion of voluntarily intoxicated 
complainants by section 75(2)(f). A void still remains between sobriety and excessive 
voluntary intoxication causing unconsciousness. Complainants drinking moderately in 
between these two extremes are left unprotected whereas more irresponsible 
complainants drinking themselves into unconsciousness gain the protection of the 
SOA. Currently, complainants falling outside the restrictive sections 75(2)(d) or (f), 
are left to be considered under section 74 and its prevailing issue of capacity. 
 
Section 74 requires a complainant to have the freedom and capacity to make a 
choice about whether they consent to sexual intercourse. Capacity is an elusive 
concept and an essential factor in considering intoxication. The problem in the 
context of the SOA is that no definition of capacity is provided to accompany its 
inclusion in section 74. Despite the courts recognising it is sought after, no 
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 Ibid.
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 Temkin and Ashworth, „The Sexual Offences Act 2003‟, p.339. 
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comprehensive guidance has yet been provided for the interpretation of capacity. It is 
the task of the trial judge to provide direction to juries in each individual case. The 
reason no comprehensive direction has currently been offered may be indicative of 
the fact that „trial judges may need detailed guidance about how properly to address 
their task in such cases.‟41  
 
The only guidance that can be construed on the interpretation of capacity comes 
from the current case law. There are two significant cases, post SOA, giving insight 
into the level of intoxication required for a complainant to be lacking capacity to 
consent. First is R v Dougal [2005]42 which involved a highly intoxicated student. She 
claimed to have been raped in a corridor after being carried home. She had only 
vague recollections of the incident but maintained that she would not have consented 
to sex in a corridor. The judge firmly stated that a „drunken consent is still consent‟43 
and instructed the jury to find the defendant not guilty even if they disagreed. The 
complainant‟s capacity to consent was not considered and any level of intoxication 
did not seem to negate consent in the judge‟s opinion. The latest and most 
authoritative case on intoxication and consent is R v Bree. Both the complainant and 
the defendant had been drinking heavily. The complainant was intoxicated to the 
point of vomiting and had a „very patchy‟44 recollection of the night in question. She 
also agreed that she did not say „no‟ to sexual intercourse and in moments that she 
could not recall she admitted she could not be sure whether she responded to the 
defendant‟s advances. The defendant maintained that the complainant consented 
and further, that he reasonably believed she consented. The Court of Appeal 
quashed the defendant‟s conviction for rape on two main grounds. Firstly, it was held 
that the trial judge failed to properly direct the jury on the meaning of capacity and its 
significance to consent where intoxication is involved. Lord Justice Judge confirmed 
that: 
 the jury should have been given some assistance with the meaning of capacity 
in circumstances where the complainant was affected by her own voluntarily 
induced intoxication, and also whether, and to what extent, they could take that 
into account in deciding whether she had consented.45  
 
Secondly, the conviction was quashed as the change of prosecution route from 
unconsciousness under section 75(2)(d) to lack of consent due do incapacity under 
                                                 
41
 Elvin, „The Concept of Consent under the Sexual Offences Act 2003‟, p.519. 
42
 R v Dougal [2005] Swansea Crown Court unreported, Guardian, 24 November 2005.  
43
 Ibid. 
44
 R v Bree [2007] EWCA 256 at 9. 
45
 Ibid., at 39. 
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section 74, was not explained to the jury. Neither was the fact that the intoxication 
could have caused the complainant to act with fewer inhibitions hence the 
defendant‟s belief in consent may have been reasonable. 
 
Capacity was discussed at length by the Court and has been subsequently analysed 
by academics. It was thought that on proper construction of section 74, clear 
conclusions could be drawn regarding capacity and it was asserted that: 
 
If, through drink, (or for any other reason) the complainant has temporarily lost 
her capacity to choose whether to have intercourse on the relevant occasion, 
she is not consenting…However, where the complainant has voluntarily 
consumed even substantial quantities of alcohol, but nevertheless remains 
capable of choosing whether or not to have intercourse, and in drink agrees to 
do so, this would not be rape.‟46 
 
In concluding this, the Court of Appeal confirmed that as a matter of „practical 
reality…capacity to consent may evaporate well before a complainant becomes 
unconscious.‟47 This is accompanied by recognition that capacity is fact specific. 
Individuals vary in their tolerance to alcohol and this provided the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeal for not finding it possible to provide a generally applicable definition 
of capacity. Loveless recognises that in light of individual tolerances, „to provide a 
rigid definition may infringe individual autonomy‟48 therefore, case-to-case, it is still a 
matter of interpretation. Rumney and Fenton accept that: 
 given the general complexities of the area the court could not have been 
expected to produce a definitive statement. However, some indication of the 
factors to be considered by judges when directing rape juries…would have 
been useful.49  
 
On the other hand, Miles asserts that „The law on this is now probably as clear as it 
can be‟, given the complexities of the concept of capacity.50 Overall, Elvin believes 
Bree to have done „little, if anything, to increase consistency in this area of law‟51 and 
that it arguably „raised more questions than it answered.‟52 The case illustrates the 
difficulties in this area of law, in particular with determining capacity.  
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 Ibid., at 34. 
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 Ibid. 
48
 Loveless, Criminal Law, p.522. 
49
 Rumney, P., and Fenton, R., „Intoxicated consent in rape: Bree and juror decision-making‟, 
(2008) 71(2)  Modern Law Review p.228. 
50
 Miles, „Sexual offences: consent, capacity and children‟. 
51
 Elvin, J., „The Concept of Consent‟. 
52
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In deciding cases on their individual facts, intoxication also becomes an issue with 
evidence provided by a complainant. It has been found that a worrying 13% of 
intoxicated complainants were uncertain if they had even been raped.53 Card 
recognises that: 
 
Where [the complainant] was clearly intoxicated at the time of the alleged 
offence, evidential difficulties may arise as to whether any reliance can be 
placed on [the complainant‟s] account of events.54  
 
Such difficulties were present in R v Hysa [2007]55 where it was initially held that 
there was no case to answer given the complainant‟s vague recollections of the 
incident. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against this decision, reinstating the 
fact that consent, or lack of it, is an issue for the jury to determine. It is difficult to 
comprehend how a jury can ever be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt when a 
complainant‟s recollections are incoherent due to intoxication. 
 
A study conducted by Amnesty International found that 30% of people in the United 
Kingdom believe that a woman is partially or completely to blame for being raped if 
she has been drinking.56 This is reflected by the current law since a voluntarily 
intoxicated complainant is largely unprotected under the SOA.  Hysa confirmed that 
there is no need for a complainant to say „no‟ in order for consent to be absent. It is 
apparent though that this point needs to be emphasised to juries. Hallett LJ only went 
as far as stating the case was „yet another sad example of what can happen when 
young people roam the streets of our cities vulnerable through drink and/or drugs.‟ 
The issue of whether a complainant is culpable for being raped whilst intoxicated was 
not addressed. Elvin believes Hallett LJ‟s characterisation of the events is worrying 
as „it brings to mind the empirical research that suggests that some jurors think that 
women are totally responsible when they are raped while intoxicated.‟57 Academics 
agree that trial judges need to provide sufficient guidance to remove such 
preconceptions held by jurors. It surely cannot be the law‟s intention to leave 
intoxicated complainants unprotected, but without express provisions making this 
clear to a jury, or further guidance provided by judges, jurors will continue to interpret 
the law in this incorrect way. 
 
                                                 
53
 Fears over alcohol link to rape, BBC News, 21 December 2005. 
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Leigh concludes that in Bree: 
The Court's affirmation that want of capacity to consent may be established 
before the victim reaches a state of stupefaction appears to meet, at least in 
part, concerns expressed in academic and other writings.58  
 
On the contrary she recognises that the „judgment gives no comfort to those who 
would require a complainant virtually to act as an insurer of her own sobriety and 
thus bodily integrity.‟59 The Bree judgment provides the most extensive guidance thus 
far and the general rule seems to be clear that a drunken consent is still consent. It is 
useful to note Simester and Sullivan‟s comments in 2004 whereby they 
acknowledged the phrase „a drunken intent is nevertheless an intent‟60 and thought 
that the same phraseology should not be used in the sense that a drunken consent is 
still consent.61 It is evident that some academics may find the position of the law 
towards intoxicated complainants unsatisfactory, however as Judge stated  in Bree 
the phrase „a drunken consent is still consent‟ is only suitable as a shorthand 
overview of the law‟s position.  
 
3 Mental Disorders and Capacity to Consent 
Under Article 8 European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), each individual has 
a right to a private life, which Dudgeon v UK (1981)62 confirms to include a private 
sex life. During another European case, X and Y v Netherlands (1985),63 the 
European Court had to consider the requirement for a correct balance between the 
right to sexuality and the right to protection from sexual abuse. It was held that 
Member States have an obligation to provide such balanced protection, in particular 
when vulnerable persons such as those with mental disorders are involved. Herring 
notes that: 
 
On the one hand [the law] should respect the rights of those with mental 
disorders to engage in consensual sexual activity, while on the other it should 
safeguard them from sexual abuse.64 
 
In accordance with the ECHR, striking this balance was presumably the aim of the 
SOA. Maher recognises the difficulties with attempting to strike this balance given the 
                                                 
58
 Leigh, „Two cases on consent in rape‟, p.8. 
59
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60
 Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355 at 369. 
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Plymouth Law Review (2010) 1 
 
35 
 
„considerable diversity of people with mental impairment in terms of extent of 
impairment, living circumstances, and sexual interests and knowledge.‟65 This 
highlights the diverse nature of mental disorders, each having a different and 
somewhat unpredictable effect upon each individual. Issues inevitably arise through 
the difficulties in comprehending whether a complainant with a mental disorder, be it 
permanent or transitional, had the capacity to consent to the sexual activity at the 
material time. 
 
Sections 30-44 SOA are specific provisions covering the protection of persons with 
mental disorders. The relevant offences in the context of consent are those contained 
in sections 30 and 31 which cover Sexual activity with a person with a mental 
disorder impeding choice, and Causing or inciting a person, with a mental disorder 
impeding choice, to engage in sexual activity, respectively. The consent provisions 
contained in sections 74-76 are not applicable here. Essentially, consent under 
sections 30 and 31, is dealt with by subsection 2 of each provision. The sections use 
the phraseology that an offence is only committed if the individual with a mental 
disorder impeding choice („complainant‟) is unable to refuse because of or for a 
reason related to a mental disorder. This is the equivalent to absence of capacity to 
consent to sexual activity as required by section 74.  
 
The offences also hold a defendant liable under subsections 1(d) of the relevant 
provisions if he „…knows or could reasonably be expected to know that [the 
complainant] has a mental disorder and that because of it or for a reason related to it 
[the complainant] is likely to be unable to refuse.‟ 
 
This test should be applied taking into consideration the defendant‟s knowledge and 
understanding of the relevant mental condition alongside his own mental abilities. It 
contains a subjective element that lends itself well to the characteristics of 
complainants and offers a high level of protection. However, in comparison to the 
equivalent test under the sexual offences in sections 1-4 which require only that a 
defendant had reasonable belief in consent, it is a more stringent test for the 
prosecution to satisfy. It is not enough for the defendant to simply have believed in 
consent if there were factors that may have suggested to him that the complainant 
was suffering the effects of a mental disorder. Stevenson et al recognise that this is 
more readily established by the prosecution where the defendant is a carer for the 
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complainant or has professional experience working with people with mental 
disorders. In other cases it is not so easy to determine:  
 
that [the defendant] could reasonably be expected to have the relevant 
knowledge, especially in cases where there are no external distinguishing 
features that might indicate mental disorder and [the defendant] has no pre-
existing knowledge of [the complainant].66 
 
A defendant must have some awareness of the mental disorder present, as well as 
being aware that it may affect the complainant‟s ability to refuse. A successful 
prosecution is consequently much more likely where the complainant‟s mental 
disorder is one more obvious to a layperson.67 
 
The use of the term unable to refuse in the offences is arguably vague however; 
subsections 2 of the relevant provisions do provide a definition. A complainant is 
unable to refuse if: 
 
(a) he lacks the capacity to choose whether to agree to the touching (whether 
because he lacks sufficient understanding of the nature or reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of what is being done, or for any other reason), 
or  
(b) he is unable to communicate such a choice to A. 
 
Card et al, describe the subsection as providing a „comprehensive definition‟68 as to 
what is meant by unable to refuse. Notice the use of capacity in (a). The lack of a 
definition of capacity in the SOA has proven to be problematic in cases of 
intoxication. The problems with the concept here are considerably reduced as 
subsection 2(a) provides guidance for its application. It requires that a person having 
capacity to choose whether to agree to the touching must have sufficient 
understanding of the nature…of what is being done. This is interpreted to mean that 
a complainant must appreciate the sexual nature of the material act. Card asserts 
that the understanding of sexual nature test can be satisfied by a relatively low level 
of knowledge and understanding.69 Subsection 2(a) also requires appreciation of 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of the sexual activity for capacity to be 
present. These consequences are assumed to be pregnancy and sexual disease 
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transmission. Appreciation of these complements an understanding of the nature of 
the material act. The subsection also states that capacity can be lacking for any other 
reason. This provides for encompassing a wide range of circumstances in which a 
person suffering from a mental disorder may be protected. On the other hand, it 
leaves the concept of capacity in an indefinite state. In respect of subsection 2(b), 
Toulsen J in Hulme v DPP (2006)70 provided a useful explanation; a person is unable 
to communicate a choice if they are physically able to speak but unable to effectively 
do so in the way that someone of his age and not suffering from his disabilities would 
have done in similar circumstances. This is a logical interpretation, providing further 
assistance in the process of determining whether a person is unable to refuse. 
 
In terms of the protection offered to complainants in conjunction with the recognition 
of sexual autonomy, Ormerod believes the offences „represent a marked 
improvement on the pre-Act position,‟71 but also reviews them as „broad, unduly 
complex, [with] numerous alternative elements creating various permutations of the 
offence[s].‟72 R v C73 is the most authoritative case in this area with the House of 
Lords providing further guidance and interpretation of the offences. The complainant 
suffered from a schizo-affective disorder, a low IQ and a history of harmful use of 
alcohol. The defendant was convicted of section 30 for sexual activity with the 
complainant who was held to be unable to refuse due to a mental disorder whilst the 
defendant could reasonably have known this. The defendant‟s appeal was successful 
and the case progressed to the House of Lords where a „very welcome judgment‟74 
was provided.  
 
There were three questions certified for the consideration of the House of Lords. 
Firstly, it was to be evaluated whether the correct position of the law was that for the 
purpose of section 30, lack of capacity to choose should not be situation or person 
specific. The House of Lords thought that the lack of capacity to choose depended 
upon the complainant‟s state of mind and understanding of the specific act at the 
material time. Baroness Hale made this clear: 
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One does not consent to sex in general. One consents to this act of sex with 
this person at this time and in this place. Autonomy entails the freedom and 
the capacity to make a choice of whether or not to do so.75  
 
A complainant‟s capacity is therefore situation and person specific, making it a 
suitably flexible test by covering a vast range of situations and complementing the 
diverse nature of mental disorders. 
 
The complainant in R v C submitted to have engaged in the act in question only as a 
result of becoming panicked and afraid. The second certified question was 
consequently whether an irrational fear could amount to a lack of capacity to choose. 
More specifically whether it could be encompassed by the phrase any other reason 
under section 30(2)(a). The House of Lords concluded that the phrase was to be 
interpreted as capable of encompassing a wide range of circumstances;76 a contrast 
to the Court of Appeal‟s approach. Baroness Hale stated that such circumstances 
were to include compulsions, delusions or irrational fears,77 clarifying that irrational 
fears do amount to a lack of capacity to choose.  
 
The third question centred upon section 30(2)(b). The Court of Appeal held that the 
section was only capable of covering physical inability to communicate a choice – a 
restrictive approach.78 The House of Lords disagreed and held that the inability to 
communicate referred to any disability, be it physical or mental as caused by, or 
related to, a mental disorder. This interpretation furthered the protection offered to 
complainants than that provided previously by the Court of Appeal. Maher described 
the whole point of R v C to be that: 
 
it simply cannot be said that all people with any mental disorder lack capacity to 
consent to sexual activity. The focus is always on a particular person at a 
particular time in respect of a particular act.79 
 
It seems that after the interpretation in R v C, section 30 is now „an effective tool‟80 in 
providing sufficient and balanced protection. Herring suggests that „the judgment is a 
welcome recognition of the rights of those with a mental disorder.‟81 On the other 
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hand, there is an alternative prosecution route under the SOA which cannot be 
overlooked, making it questionable whether the mental disorder offences are truly 
necessary. 
 
Most defendants who are convicted under section 30 could also be convicted of rape 
under section 1, and this was in fact the position in R v C. It was held that 
compulsions, delusions or irrational fears, are capable of amounting to a lack of 
capacity to choose. It follows logically that a complainant suffering any of these 
characteristics lacks the capacity to consent. Evidently, they fall neatly under section 
74‟s definition of consent and given the lack of capacity, they have provided no valid 
consent to the material act. If consent is absent, the sexual intercourse amounts to 
rape. The defendant could in this instance be given a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment, as opposed to 14 years imprisonment under section 30. In this respect 
the mental disorder offences seem neither necessary nor capable of offering 
maximum protection. 
 
Ormerod believes that the fact that rape and section 30 in respect of a mentally 
impaired complainant are interchangeable does not mean that section 30 is 
superfluous.82 In R v C, Baroness Hale gave two explanations as to why the section 
30 offence may be preferred to one of rape. Firstly, in charging section 30, „the 
prosecution has only to prove the inability to refuse rather than that the complainant 
actually did not consent.‟83 In essence this is suggesting that the actus reus is easier 
to establish. By the same means, the second explanation was that the mens rea may 
also be easier to ascertain. Under section 30 it is sufficient that the defendant knows 
or should reasonably have known that the complainant had a mental disorder likely to 
make them unable to refuse, as opposed the defendant not having reasonable belief 
in consent. Herring believes neither of these explanations to be entirely convincing 
and further points out, „it is hard to think of a case where a defendant would be guilty 
of an offence under s.30, but not be guilty of the offence of rape or sexual assault.‟84  
 
Despite their questionable necessity the mental disorder provisions, combined with 
the judgment of R v C, appear to be well constructed and interpreted to provide 
comprehensive protection. Stevenson et al believe that the: 
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substantive offences are likely to produce a much better balance of the need to 
protect the rights of vulnerable persons to understand and exercise their 
sexuality with their right to be protected by the law from sexual abuse and 
exploitation.85 
 
This coincides with the aim of the SOA: to remove the approach that assumed all 
mentally impaired individuals lacked capacity and consequently denied them 
autonomous choices86.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The primary issue with the definition of consent under section 74 appears to be the 
ambiguity of the terms used. In particular, capacity is left without definition and its 
interpretation has proven problematic. The main issues with the consent provisions 
contained within sections 75-76 have been highlighted to be their restrictive content 
and lack of significant addition to the previous law. Controversially, transmission of 
sexual disease through sexual intercourse has been confirmed by R v B87 not to 
affect consent. Herring strongly opposes this position: 
 
We need to move away from the simplistic question, “did the victim say yes or 
no”. Instead we should be asking how the victim understood the act that she 
was consenting to.88   
 
Academics do not fully concur and arguments are put forward on various grounds, 
highlighting the uncertainty of what the current preferred position may be and why. It 
has been suggested that „the question of how to deal with the problem of STIs and 
the place of the criminal law is one which the Law Commission might well wish to 
explore.‟89 This would ideally provide additional protection or alternatively, an 
explanation as to why such a horrific, deceptive and potentially life threatening 
experience that occurred through sexual intercourse cannot currently be accepted to 
amount to rape. 
 
Intoxication has proven a difficult contributory factor to determining consent. Section 
75 only provides protection where a complainant is involuntarily intoxicated or so 
drunk as to be rendered unconscious. This leaves the remainder of cases to fall 
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under section 74.  Wallerstein acknowledges the drastic interpretation that is required 
of section 74 to determine the capacity of a voluntarily intoxicated complainant. She 
criticises the poor conviction rates and believes that if the problem „is not being 
rectified by the courts, it is necessary for the legislature to intervene and give more 
specific guidance.‟90  
 
The sexual autonomy of individuals with mental disorders is protected by the SOA 
sufficiently. Guidance is provided on the interpretation of unable to refuse, making its 
application more straightforward than the general definition of consent and its 
inclusion of capacity. The offences have been praised for striking the correct balance 
between protecting the sexual autonomy of persons with a mental disorder at the 
same time as protecting them from sexual abuse. Further praise can be given for 
their wide application. Considering that an individual‟s mental disorder may have 
unpredictable effects and durability in different scenarios, the current law seems 
effective. Despite the perceived success of the sections, the issue still persists that 
the sections may not truly be necessary and a more serious non-consensual crime 
such as rape or sexual assault could be rightly charged. 
 
The primary issues combine to conclude that a number of grey areas still remain 
unresolved and the consent provisions are not completely comprehensive in 
providing protection. It is arguable that as this is the first time an attempt at a 
definition of consent has been made and in attempting to define the complexities of 
such a concept, room for improvement is inevitable. On the other hand, in dealing 
with such sensitive issues and considering the extensive research and promising 
recommendations of Setting the Boundaries, it seems fair to expect an unambiguous 
extension to the protection previously offered on the first attempt.  
 
In answer to whether the SOA will improve justice for the complainants of rape 
Loveless asserts „that it is too soon to say.‟91 The SOA has been in place for over six 
years, however, with such complex and broad issues it may take time for the courts 
to embrace its interpretation and provide guidance, despite the recognition from 
many academics that before such a time, protection is in a lesser state than it should 
be for victims. 
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